Monday, October 16, 2006
"WHYS" THAT AREN'T ALL THEY SEEM
Her personal regrets regarding her personal opinions of her own personal reactions personally to seeing the current U.S. president on TV notwithstanding, The Times' Alice Miles presents to us several "explanations" of "whys" that . . . well, aren't really "whys", but make good "whys"-reading, one supposes:
That's one that no one can seem to put a stake through. Again, "the administration" dismantled nothing. Paul Bremer, in the NRO, January 10, 2006:
Next, another of Ms Miles' "whys":
So what exactly would the U.S. have done differently regarding North Korea had the U.S. not destroyed the Hussein regime? Let's think. Attacked North Korea? Or yelled at it with greater nodding "world approval" than the U.S. supposedly gets currently?
What is now is much as what had been the case, indeed had been long before there was ever a Saddam ruling Iraq: South Korea did not, and does not, desire to bring on a military confrontation with the North; it is, in fact, hard to conceive of a situation in which it would offensively. And without the South's approval, there was, and is, no way the U.S. would undertake such action. (Remember, the horrific Korean War from 1950-1953 began when the North invaded the South; the South has since possessed an almost entirely "defensive" view of the North.)
All that's left is what has been the norm since 1953: "Negotiation". In short, "the muck" the U.S. has supposedly made of Iraq since 2003 has nothing substantive to do with its response to North Korea's nuclear test.
And another:
Finally, if the U.S. had indeed "prioritised" North Korea over Iraq, "the world" and Ms Miles would not now be wondering aloud on TV and in editorial pages, why, oh why the U.S. is seemingly "hypnotised" by the weak, little dictator starving his people on the north of the Korean peninsula, ignoring other, more vital issues, all while of course the South, Japan and China could better handle the situation?
And "the world" and Ms Miles certainly would not now also be demanding why, oh why the U.S. were not paying much closer attention to the danger a potentially WMD and nuclear armed, oil-financed Saddam presents to the wider Middle East, especially given that his brutal regime remains a tremendous obstacle to achieving "real peace" between Israel and the Palestinians (which is, as we all "know", the "real cause" of every single problem befalling "the Muslim world")?
"The world" would also not now be crying out that the U.S. refuses obstinately to do anything about Saddam because Saddam has oil and therefore the U.S. wishes to "do a deal" with him, while, on the other hand, the U.S. chooses (for no good reason anyone can ascertain) to "take its eye off the ball" and "pick on" the obviously hapless North Korea?
No, no, of course, none of that would be the case. Right?
Relatedly, also in The Times, William Rees-Moog:
Hmmmmm. However, also worth bearing in mind, this, from The Wall Street Journal, November 2003:
Her personal regrets regarding her personal opinions of her own personal reactions personally to seeing the current U.S. president on TV notwithstanding, The Times' Alice Miles presents to us several "explanations" of "whys" that . . . well, aren't really "whys", but make good "whys"-reading, one supposes:
...the whole administration is portrayed as dysfunctional, fragile, unable to admit or unwilling even to see, let alone correct, possible mistakes such as the dismantling of the Iraqi military...
That's one that no one can seem to put a stake through. Again, "the administration" dismantled nothing. Paul Bremer, in the NRO, January 10, 2006:
...The facts are these: There was not a single Iraqi army unit intact in the country at Liberation. There was no army to “disband.” It had “self-demobilized,” in the Pentagon’s phrase. Hundreds of thousand of Shia draftees, seeing which way the war was going, had simply gone home. They were not going to come back into a hated army.
The army and intelligence services had been vital instruments of Saddam’s brutal regime. He had used the army in a years’ long campaign against the Kurds, killing tens of thousands of them, culminating in the use of chemical weapons against men, women, and children in 1988. The army had brutally suppressed the Shia uprising after the first Gulf war, machine gunning tens of thousands of Shia civilians into mass graves in the south. Together these two groups make up about 80 percent of the population.
So recalling the Iraqi army (which would have meant sending American soldiers into Shia homes, farms, and villages and forcing them back into the army under their Sunni officers) would have had dire political consequences. The Kurds told me clearly that they would not have accepted it, and would have seceded from Iraq. Such a move would probably have ended Shia cooperation with the Coalition and perhaps even led to a Shia uprising, initially against such an Iraqi army, and eventually against the Coalition.
But we knew we had to find a place in Iraqi society for the former army men. So we welcomed them back into the new army, including officers up to the level of colonel. And we started paying the other officers a monthly stipend, which continued right to the end of the occupation...
The army and intelligence services had been vital instruments of Saddam’s brutal regime. He had used the army in a years’ long campaign against the Kurds, killing tens of thousands of them, culminating in the use of chemical weapons against men, women, and children in 1988. The army had brutally suppressed the Shia uprising after the first Gulf war, machine gunning tens of thousands of Shia civilians into mass graves in the south. Together these two groups make up about 80 percent of the population.
So recalling the Iraqi army (which would have meant sending American soldiers into Shia homes, farms, and villages and forcing them back into the army under their Sunni officers) would have had dire political consequences. The Kurds told me clearly that they would not have accepted it, and would have seceded from Iraq. Such a move would probably have ended Shia cooperation with the Coalition and perhaps even led to a Shia uprising, initially against such an Iraqi army, and eventually against the Coalition.
But we knew we had to find a place in Iraqi society for the former army men. So we welcomed them back into the new army, including officers up to the level of colonel. And we started paying the other officers a monthly stipend, which continued right to the end of the occupation...
Next, another of Ms Miles' "whys":
...it is clear that the US cannot respond as it once might have to the test conducted in North Korea. Because of the muck it has made in Iraq, it lacks the political and moral authority to do so
So what exactly would the U.S. have done differently regarding North Korea had the U.S. not destroyed the Hussein regime? Let's think. Attacked North Korea? Or yelled at it with greater nodding "world approval" than the U.S. supposedly gets currently?
What is now is much as what had been the case, indeed had been long before there was ever a Saddam ruling Iraq: South Korea did not, and does not, desire to bring on a military confrontation with the North; it is, in fact, hard to conceive of a situation in which it would offensively. And without the South's approval, there was, and is, no way the U.S. would undertake such action. (Remember, the horrific Korean War from 1950-1953 began when the North invaded the South; the South has since possessed an almost entirely "defensive" view of the North.)
All that's left is what has been the norm since 1953: "Negotiation". In short, "the muck" the U.S. has supposedly made of Iraq since 2003 has nothing substantive to do with its response to North Korea's nuclear test.
And another:
Were it to have wanted to address North Korea’s nuclear pretensions, it should have prioritised it over Iraq; the world knew Kim was a brutal tyrant with a nuclear weapon within his reach...
Finally, if the U.S. had indeed "prioritised" North Korea over Iraq, "the world" and Ms Miles would not now be wondering aloud on TV and in editorial pages, why, oh why the U.S. is seemingly "hypnotised" by the weak, little dictator starving his people on the north of the Korean peninsula, ignoring other, more vital issues, all while of course the South, Japan and China could better handle the situation?
And "the world" and Ms Miles certainly would not now also be demanding why, oh why the U.S. were not paying much closer attention to the danger a potentially WMD and nuclear armed, oil-financed Saddam presents to the wider Middle East, especially given that his brutal regime remains a tremendous obstacle to achieving "real peace" between Israel and the Palestinians (which is, as we all "know", the "real cause" of every single problem befalling "the Muslim world")?
"The world" would also not now be crying out that the U.S. refuses obstinately to do anything about Saddam because Saddam has oil and therefore the U.S. wishes to "do a deal" with him, while, on the other hand, the U.S. chooses (for no good reason anyone can ascertain) to "take its eye off the ball" and "pick on" the obviously hapless North Korea?
No, no, of course, none of that would be the case. Right?
_____________________________
Relatedly, also in The Times, William Rees-Moog:
...The President gave the post-war responsibility for the reconstruction of Iraq to the Pentagon under Mr Rumsfeld rather than the State Department under Colin Powell. He preferred the unqualified and, in this respect, the incompetent department...
Hmmmmm. However, also worth bearing in mind, this, from The Wall Street Journal, November 2003:
...No one outside the Council on Foreign Relations ever imagined the plan was for even a semi-permanent U.S. occupation. The idea was to liberate the country from Saddam, then establish a political process in which Iraqis could compete and govern themselves. If the Bush Administration has made a mistake in Iraq, it was in not beginning that process well before the war, with a government-in-exile and a large Iraqi security force. President Bush came down on the side of the State Department and CIA officials who opposed such an effort...
¶ by Robert, Monday, October 16, 2006
