Friday, September 15, 2006
GLORY FOR NOTHING
We all know the famous painting of "General George Washington Crossing the Delaware":
General George Washington crossing the Delaware at the Battle of Trenton on Christmas night 1776 by Emmanuel Leutze
But we also know it is not exactly a photograph (not even a Reuters one) of the event. As NPR rightly notes:
Actually, he probably was standing. They all would have been, because the boats were more like barges -- with high sides, that allowed two men to walk upon and down and ram the poles into the water and repeat, thus guiding it across.
Anyway, none of that's important. And that's the point. There is no question that the painting captures the desperate nature of his plan. It was also freezing. There was lots of ice. There was a swollen current, and heavy wind. And he always looked the part of "His Excellency", so certainly did even that night. All in all, horrendous factual errors notwithstanding, presumably it is still okay to refer to it as a somewhat reasonable representation of the crossing?
I note that because of the predictable hemming and hawing by many over certain aspects of the script of "The Path to 9/11". But most of that misses the point. It is not a question of what was compressed, who said absolutely, precisely, incontrovertibly what at which meeting (assuming the minutes are accurate, just imagine having to sit through a film like that?), whether a (now dead) Massoud ever uttered verbatim what he is scripted as saying, or the nature of a reaction to the "Aug 6 PDB". All films much engage in some measure of "theatrics" or they would be utterly unwatchable. There has never been a single, noteworthy historical painting, or film, that is the exact equivalent of an academic reference text.
For instance, the film "Patton" is riddled with inaccuracies, and some are quite historically misleading. According to a well-regarded Patton biographer:
1) On separate occasions in Sicily Patton slapped two soldiers, not just one.
2) The portrayal of his awaiting Montgomery's arrival in Messina is false.
3) Patton was given command of Third Army in late January 1944, not following the film's July 1944 "one-to-one with Bradley" in Normandy, in which Patton is shown pleading to be given the command.
4) At the conference hurridly called to determine how to respond to the German Ardennes attack, Eisenhower is referred to as if he isn't there. But Eisenhower was present; he headed the meeting.
5) The famous "weather prayer" incident occurred not in the Ardennes just before Christmas, but over a month earlier in Lorraine.
6) Patton's infamous phone conversation in the film with Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, in which Patton is seen thundering about wishing to attack the Soviets, never took place in real life. Oh, Patton said essentially what's shown . . . but to someone else. (Bedell Smith himself possessed by nearly all accounts a frightening, autocratic personality. Yet in the film -- and so in many respects, to history -- comes across as pleasant and approachable, played as he is by the affable actor Edward Binns.)
7) Patton's nearly being killed by the ox cart happened in March 1945, not, as portrayed in film, moments after his saying goodbye to his staff after being relieved as commander of Third Army. That relief took place late in the summer.
And the list could go on. Yet, despite all that, the film nevertheless earned numerous plaudits and won George C. Scott an Oscar. So, how about similar war films? "The Longest Day"? "The Battle of the Bulge"? "Midway"? And more recently, "Enemy at the Gates"? Let's not get started, shall we. So any -- even good -- historical films have "inaccuracies".
Also, perhaps inevitably since it is a moving picture on the subject, comparisons are made with Michael Moore's moving picture, "Fahrenheit 9/11". Let's take a moment on this.
The basic problem with Moore's production (and its numerous shortcomings have been famously well-analysed) is of a different order compared to that facing "Path". Moore's film is at best an "impersonation" of a documentary; hence, the evident careful terming of it as "an examination". That makes sense, for he can't really call it an outright documentary because he has very little "documentation". Bottom line: another "The World at War", every sane person agrees, "Fahrenheit" definitely is not. So, neither "documentary", nor "feature film", Moore's is neither fish nor fowl. (No semi-pun intended.)
In contrast, "Path" is clearly a feature, and tells us as much. But, in fact, it is arguably more documentary than "Fahrenheit" in that at least "Path" is based largely on the final "9/11 Commission Report", which is considered by just about everyone to be the fairest, best researched review of what led to 9/11. So any comparison of "Path" to Moore is misplaced.
The main issue apparently irritating many is that they feel "Path's" inaccuracies stem from mostly one side: Clinton's. Actually, it just seems that way. For since most of the film covered a time frame in parallel with the 1993-2001 Clinton administration, it is therefore unavoidable that the Clinton people got much more "air time", and therefore, by default, their "actions" or "inactions" appeared to loom much larger in the scheme of things. (Hey, Clinton won the re-election he wanted in 1996, so his people have to take the hits. What would a Dole administration have done? We can't know. But probably little all that different.)
And the film doesn't exactly portray the (in office not even 9 months, as of September 11) Bush people as all that sharp either. (The wife noted she felt both prominent women -- Albright and Rice -- had been made to look particularly inflexible and detached.) However, consider this: if Gore had been elected in 2000, and everything else had happened exactly the same way, could anyone have made a partisan case about the film's faults? It's hard to see how.
"Path" should be best judged by this yardstick: As a feature film -- not a documentary -- purporting to recount historical events, does "Path" effectively present an overall narrative that captures the essence of its factual source material? Well, for all its inaccuracy, based on its sources Leutze's painting did. The film "Patton" did also. Similarly, despite flaws, "Path" does seem to do so as well. Its central argument is pretty much what the "9/11 Commission Report" indicted as having helped make the attacks possible: non-partisan bureaucratic lethargy, infighting and even paralysis. As the Report opened one chapter:
That last line, we know, is in Washington a recipe for "masterful inactivity" at best. And as the Report also told us:
Which is hardly a surprise. In any job, no matter how important, we all see the same things: contraints, boundaries, the weeks it can take sometimes to move the copy machine from that wall . . . over to that wall. That's what the film tried to convey. In that sense, I feel it got it right.
But I sort of touched upon that in another post. Yet there is another HUGE aspect I didn't mention: the nature and reactions of the hordes of people who hold "responsible" posts below that of the president, but above the rank of sergeant. Essentially, I'm talking here about the "high fliers".
The response from many of them -- Samantha Burns demonstrates yet again that a drawing is worth a thousand words -- to what they consider the inaccuracies of the film are not surprising. At one time, films such as these were not made while so many people of responsibility being portrayed were still living. (By the time they made "Tora! Tora! Tora!" most of the major characters portrayed were in their graves.) So now films such as these have to cope with the litigation culture and overly inflated politico/bureaucrat egos. Those of hyper-ego, convinced as they are of their own sublime extra significance, are naturally easily angered at seeing themselves in what they consider any all too human and imperfect light.
Thus the whinging from those who naturally wish to ring-fence their public persona, who desire to compose memoirs only they control, and are determined to make it appear to all of us that they know what they are about, and that they have an answer for everything. I'm exaggerating to some extent (but I don't believe in some cases by much), but how many, secretly, glanced in the mirror each morning and yearned to be modern versions of George Washington, saving the republic?
Probably more than we imagine. Yet it had never dawned on any of them that they likely couldn't do both. That's because to save anything, you have to be willing at certain pivotal times to risk making an error, go with your instinct, risk your reputation, stick your neck out and make a decision, consequences be damned. The facts on that in the run-up to September 11, 2001 are clear enough: in both administrations no one would commit to making a decision.
If anything, it has been good for the country that a Democratic administration made such a mess of things, followed by a Republican doing much the same things. What might be termed the non-partisan continuity of ineptitude is actually oddly something for which we should be thankful: neither side can say the other is entirely at fault. And, as Dean Esmay points out (via Murdoc):
He's right. It is NOT about a "right wing" view, or a "left wing" view, or about blaming one administration more than the other. They were both at fault. Why?
Because self-important people in both administrations were NOT doing all they could. Oh, they were willing to go through the motions in the time-honored manner, and did what was required to keep their jobs. Yet the notion of, for instance, focusing not just on what the enemy was perceived to be capable of doing, but of what he might damn well try to do, and even to consider trying to stop him before he did so, had evidently entered no one's head . . . at least, not any heads of anyone in a position to do anything. Indeed, some clearly did not believe we even had an enemy we needed to worry about. (In graduate school, c. 1990, one Middle East born academic dismissively told me to my face that there is "no such thing as Islamic fundamentalism", and Americans had "nothing to fear". To express such to someone like myself hardly mattered. But from time to time since I've wondered who in positions of authority might have either leaned upon, or internalized, such "non-knowledge" and used such to help formulate U.S. "non-policies"?)
Essentially, no one said "Boo!" without passing the buck . . . up and up, again and again, ultimately to the President (both of them). There were always counterarguments for doing next to nothing, and "the permanent government" often proved quite adept at implementing that option, with the result that the enemy grew progressively bolder. Harry Truman could not have been more correct. The 9/11 Commission Report itself demonstrates such in encyclopedic, academic, thoroughly footnoted fashion; "Path" pretty much presents that report as drama, but even with its inaccuracies manages to do so far more accurately than if it had been a work of "Shakespeare". (For example, we all know Bohemia is not on any coast . . . although of course "global warming" may eventually prove Shakespeare was right on that after all.)
As the 9/11 Commission Report also noted, the best decisions were those made on less visible perches, by those willing to stick a neck out:
And remember this?:
And, God help us, who can forget this?:
The first two incidents were portrayed -- whether the conversations as shown are court stenographer accurate or not is immaterial -- in the film. The third was only implied. (Is the film any less reliable because that death struggle was omitted?) As we all suspect, those actions may have saved the US Capitol or the White House, and therefore constituted far more decisive actions than anything ordered up to the morning of September 11, 2001 by a department or cabinet level official in either the Clinton or Bush administrations. If anything, that is the major argument the film makes: we were saved from perhaps even greater sorrow not by any of the "great and good", but by some of the "little people".
Interestingly, as it had just before Trenton, days later when his core units' enlistments were due to expire, the moment again rested with George Washington:
While he might there seem as just another male, executive, military fascist, overreaching his power, lacking a satellite hook-up he might have instead confined himself to his hut and bombarded Congress with letters requesting instructions. ("What does counsel say?" "Do we need a finding?" "Can you corroborate this?" "What do the French know?" "What clearance do I have?" "What are our other options?".) But he couldn't wait. Within hours, if something wasn't done, he would have found himself general of nobody, and the war lost.
So, he took a chance, and stuck his neck out . . . again; a career that saw him normally more than willing to take risks to do the right thing, and humbly accept blame when things didn't go well, is why we remember him. It is pretty obvious that in the months and years prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, none of our overly inflated egos in similarly subordinate roles, but who envision themselves as another Washington, were willing, when push came to shove, actually to behave like another Washington.
Highly arrogant, yet possessing submerged fears of being caught in any error, none of them had been willing, as he had been at Trenton and afterwards, to take a calculated risk or two. Amazingly, they seemed to believe "the glory" (to be admired, applauded, fawned over, and after serving to get book deals, boardroom jobs, posts at think tanks or universities from which to pontificate on their vast experience) could be had without ever exercising "the responsibility". On one level, that's not their fault, really, because given America's blessed position of only rarely facing extreme situations, most of the time our politicians never face a single one of the extreme sort of "DECISION NEEDED NOW!" situations Washington did far more than once; so they are able mostly to get "the glory" -- even if a cheapened version -- while being able to avoid having to exercise any great amount of "the responsibility". But on another level, on September 11, 2001 America suffered greatly for its (up to then, at least) mostly blessed position.
Yes, those who served in the years leading to September 11, 2001, of course, couldn't know precisely what was coming. Dean Esmay is dead right in stating:
But unlike what confronts most politicians over their careers, after September 11, 2001 actually happened, as history crowds into those attacks as it invariably does on any pivotal moments (for instance, far more people today probably know the names of the commanders of Lee's divisions on the last day at Gettysburg than can name the presidents between Lincoln and F.D.R.), what is seen of the details simply isn't pretty. They had indeed faced what was a brewing extreme challenge, but managed never to see it. As it turned out "the responsibility" was there to be taken, and if any one properly accepted it, "the glory" earned might have been immeasurable.
But when alone with their individual authority, and even if given every aid, technology, and resource, decisions still had to be made and be the right ones. Responsibility still had to be shouldered, somewhere, by someone. However, in the end, facing it had all proved too much for all of them.
Yet had one or two accepted some responsibility, their memoirs might actually be read and taken seriously generations from now. As it is, within a few years any such reminiscences will likely be seen as little more than self-justifying, out of print irrelevancies from another era. After all, who the heck a hundred years from now will want to read "My Years in Government, 1993-2001: When I Almost Did Something"? Probably no more than the number now fascinated by the latest, say, Thomas A. Hendricks biography. ¶ by Robert, Friday, September 15, 2006
We all know the famous painting of "General George Washington Crossing the Delaware":
General George Washington crossing the Delaware at the Battle of Trenton on Christmas night 1776 by Emmanuel LeutzeBut we also know it is not exactly a photograph (not even a Reuters one) of the event. As NPR rightly notes:
...For one thing, the flag unfurling behind Washington's head didn't exist at the time of the crossing, Christmas 1776. The "Stars and Stripes" didn't replace the Grand Union Flag until six months after the event depicted. What's more, the boats used by the Continental Army would have been different, the time of day is wrong (it was actually night), and the jagged chunks of ice floating near the boat would have been smoothed over by the flow of the river. And there's no way Washington could have stood up for the journey without losing his footing and being tossed into the freezing water...
Actually, he probably was standing. They all would have been, because the boats were more like barges -- with high sides, that allowed two men to walk upon and down and ram the poles into the water and repeat, thus guiding it across.
Anyway, none of that's important. And that's the point. There is no question that the painting captures the desperate nature of his plan. It was also freezing. There was lots of ice. There was a swollen current, and heavy wind. And he always looked the part of "His Excellency", so certainly did even that night. All in all, horrendous factual errors notwithstanding, presumably it is still okay to refer to it as a somewhat reasonable representation of the crossing?
_____________________________
I note that because of the predictable hemming and hawing by many over certain aspects of the script of "The Path to 9/11". But most of that misses the point. It is not a question of what was compressed, who said absolutely, precisely, incontrovertibly what at which meeting (assuming the minutes are accurate, just imagine having to sit through a film like that?), whether a (now dead) Massoud ever uttered verbatim what he is scripted as saying, or the nature of a reaction to the "Aug 6 PDB". All films much engage in some measure of "theatrics" or they would be utterly unwatchable. There has never been a single, noteworthy historical painting, or film, that is the exact equivalent of an academic reference text.
For instance, the film "Patton" is riddled with inaccuracies, and some are quite historically misleading. According to a well-regarded Patton biographer:
1) On separate occasions in Sicily Patton slapped two soldiers, not just one.
2) The portrayal of his awaiting Montgomery's arrival in Messina is false.
3) Patton was given command of Third Army in late January 1944, not following the film's July 1944 "one-to-one with Bradley" in Normandy, in which Patton is shown pleading to be given the command.
4) At the conference hurridly called to determine how to respond to the German Ardennes attack, Eisenhower is referred to as if he isn't there. But Eisenhower was present; he headed the meeting.
5) The famous "weather prayer" incident occurred not in the Ardennes just before Christmas, but over a month earlier in Lorraine.
6) Patton's infamous phone conversation in the film with Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, in which Patton is seen thundering about wishing to attack the Soviets, never took place in real life. Oh, Patton said essentially what's shown . . . but to someone else. (Bedell Smith himself possessed by nearly all accounts a frightening, autocratic personality. Yet in the film -- and so in many respects, to history -- comes across as pleasant and approachable, played as he is by the affable actor Edward Binns.)
7) Patton's nearly being killed by the ox cart happened in March 1945, not, as portrayed in film, moments after his saying goodbye to his staff after being relieved as commander of Third Army. That relief took place late in the summer.
And the list could go on. Yet, despite all that, the film nevertheless earned numerous plaudits and won George C. Scott an Oscar. So, how about similar war films? "The Longest Day"? "The Battle of the Bulge"? "Midway"? And more recently, "Enemy at the Gates"? Let's not get started, shall we. So any -- even good -- historical films have "inaccuracies".
_____________________________
Also, perhaps inevitably since it is a moving picture on the subject, comparisons are made with Michael Moore's moving picture, "Fahrenheit 9/11". Let's take a moment on this.
The basic problem with Moore's production (and its numerous shortcomings have been famously well-analysed) is of a different order compared to that facing "Path". Moore's film is at best an "impersonation" of a documentary; hence, the evident careful terming of it as "an examination". That makes sense, for he can't really call it an outright documentary because he has very little "documentation". Bottom line: another "The World at War", every sane person agrees, "Fahrenheit" definitely is not. So, neither "documentary", nor "feature film", Moore's is neither fish nor fowl. (No semi-pun intended.)
In contrast, "Path" is clearly a feature, and tells us as much. But, in fact, it is arguably more documentary than "Fahrenheit" in that at least "Path" is based largely on the final "9/11 Commission Report", which is considered by just about everyone to be the fairest, best researched review of what led to 9/11. So any comparison of "Path" to Moore is misplaced.
_____________________________
The main issue apparently irritating many is that they feel "Path's" inaccuracies stem from mostly one side: Clinton's. Actually, it just seems that way. For since most of the film covered a time frame in parallel with the 1993-2001 Clinton administration, it is therefore unavoidable that the Clinton people got much more "air time", and therefore, by default, their "actions" or "inactions" appeared to loom much larger in the scheme of things. (Hey, Clinton won the re-election he wanted in 1996, so his people have to take the hits. What would a Dole administration have done? We can't know. But probably little all that different.)
And the film doesn't exactly portray the (in office not even 9 months, as of September 11) Bush people as all that sharp either. (The wife noted she felt both prominent women -- Albright and Rice -- had been made to look particularly inflexible and detached.) However, consider this: if Gore had been elected in 2000, and everything else had happened exactly the same way, could anyone have made a partisan case about the film's faults? It's hard to see how.
"Path" should be best judged by this yardstick: As a feature film -- not a documentary -- purporting to recount historical events, does "Path" effectively present an overall narrative that captures the essence of its factual source material? Well, for all its inaccuracy, based on its sources Leutze's painting did. The film "Patton" did also. Similarly, despite flaws, "Path" does seem to do so as well. Its central argument is pretty much what the "9/11 Commission Report" indicted as having helped make the attacks possible: non-partisan bureaucratic lethargy, infighting and even paralysis. As the Report opened one chapter:
Although the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate had warned of a new type of terrorism, many officials continued to think of terrorists as agents of states (Saudi Hezbollah acting for Iran against Khobar Towers) or as domestic criminals (Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City). As we pointed out in chapter 3, the White House is not a natural locus for program management. Hence, government efforts to cope with terrorism were essentially the work of individual agencies.
That last line, we know, is in Washington a recipe for "masterful inactivity" at best. And as the Report also told us:
...Some of the saddest aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so many individual officials straining, often without success, against the boundaries of the possible...
Which is hardly a surprise. In any job, no matter how important, we all see the same things: contraints, boundaries, the weeks it can take sometimes to move the copy machine from that wall . . . over to that wall. That's what the film tried to convey. In that sense, I feel it got it right.
But I sort of touched upon that in another post. Yet there is another HUGE aspect I didn't mention: the nature and reactions of the hordes of people who hold "responsible" posts below that of the president, but above the rank of sergeant. Essentially, I'm talking here about the "high fliers".
_____________________________
The response from many of them -- Samantha Burns demonstrates yet again that a drawing is worth a thousand words -- to what they consider the inaccuracies of the film are not surprising. At one time, films such as these were not made while so many people of responsibility being portrayed were still living. (By the time they made "Tora! Tora! Tora!" most of the major characters portrayed were in their graves.) So now films such as these have to cope with the litigation culture and overly inflated politico/bureaucrat egos. Those of hyper-ego, convinced as they are of their own sublime extra significance, are naturally easily angered at seeing themselves in what they consider any all too human and imperfect light.
Thus the whinging from those who naturally wish to ring-fence their public persona, who desire to compose memoirs only they control, and are determined to make it appear to all of us that they know what they are about, and that they have an answer for everything. I'm exaggerating to some extent (but I don't believe in some cases by much), but how many, secretly, glanced in the mirror each morning and yearned to be modern versions of George Washington, saving the republic?
Probably more than we imagine. Yet it had never dawned on any of them that they likely couldn't do both. That's because to save anything, you have to be willing at certain pivotal times to risk making an error, go with your instinct, risk your reputation, stick your neck out and make a decision, consequences be damned. The facts on that in the run-up to September 11, 2001 are clear enough: in both administrations no one would commit to making a decision.
If anything, it has been good for the country that a Democratic administration made such a mess of things, followed by a Republican doing much the same things. What might be termed the non-partisan continuity of ineptitude is actually oddly something for which we should be thankful: neither side can say the other is entirely at fault. And, as Dean Esmay points out (via Murdoc):
...I hate the people who try to blame the Clinton administration for 9/11 almost as much as I hate Michael Moore and those who try to blame it on the Bush administration...
He's right. It is NOT about a "right wing" view, or a "left wing" view, or about blaming one administration more than the other. They were both at fault. Why?
Because self-important people in both administrations were NOT doing all they could. Oh, they were willing to go through the motions in the time-honored manner, and did what was required to keep their jobs. Yet the notion of, for instance, focusing not just on what the enemy was perceived to be capable of doing, but of what he might damn well try to do, and even to consider trying to stop him before he did so, had evidently entered no one's head . . . at least, not any heads of anyone in a position to do anything. Indeed, some clearly did not believe we even had an enemy we needed to worry about. (In graduate school, c. 1990, one Middle East born academic dismissively told me to my face that there is "no such thing as Islamic fundamentalism", and Americans had "nothing to fear". To express such to someone like myself hardly mattered. But from time to time since I've wondered who in positions of authority might have either leaned upon, or internalized, such "non-knowledge" and used such to help formulate U.S. "non-policies"?)
Essentially, no one said "Boo!" without passing the buck . . . up and up, again and again, ultimately to the President (both of them). There were always counterarguments for doing next to nothing, and "the permanent government" often proved quite adept at implementing that option, with the result that the enemy grew progressively bolder. Harry Truman could not have been more correct. The 9/11 Commission Report itself demonstrates such in encyclopedic, academic, thoroughly footnoted fashion; "Path" pretty much presents that report as drama, but even with its inaccuracies manages to do so far more accurately than if it had been a work of "Shakespeare". (For example, we all know Bohemia is not on any coast . . . although of course "global warming" may eventually prove Shakespeare was right on that after all.)
_____________________________
As the 9/11 Commission Report also noted, the best decisions were those made on less visible perches, by those willing to stick a neck out:
...On August 10, shortly after getting the money from Binalshibh, Moussaoui left Oklahoma with a friend and drove to Minnesota. Three days later, Moussaoui paid the $6,800 balance owed for his flight simulator training at Pan Am in cash and began his training. His conduct, however, raised the suspicions of his flight instructor. It was unusual for a student with so little training to be learning to fly large jets without any intention of obtaining a pilot's license or other goal. On August 16, once the instructor reported his suspicion to the authorities, Moussaoui was arrested by the INS on immigration charges...
And remember this?:
...The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August...
And, God help us, who can forget this?:
...One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought the hijackers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call from the aircraft recounted specifically asking her caller whether the hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one. No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was found at the aircraft's crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time. We believe that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight's last minutes as the passengers fought back.
Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers' claim of having a bomb. The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites. One of the passengers who mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not real. Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe the bombs were probably fake.
During at least five of the passengers' phone calls, information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls described the intent of passengers and surviving crew members to revolt against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided, and acted.
At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt. One of the callers ended her message as follows: "Everyone's running up to first class. I've got to go. Bye."
The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assault muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listened to the recording report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the din. We cannot identify whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained.
In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt the assault. The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses and plates. At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane.
Five seconds later, Jarrah asked, "Is that it? Shall we finish it off?" A hijacker responded, "No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off." The sounds of fighting continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and down. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said, "In the cockpit. If we don't we'll die!" Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled, "Roll it!" Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said, "Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!" He then asked another hijacker in the cock-pit, "Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?" to which the other replied, "Yes, put it in it, and pull it down."
The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said, "Pull it down! Pull it down!" The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them. The airplane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the right. The airplane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting "Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest." With the sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes' flying time from Washington, D.C....
Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers' claim of having a bomb. The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites. One of the passengers who mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not real. Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe the bombs were probably fake.
During at least five of the passengers' phone calls, information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls described the intent of passengers and surviving crew members to revolt against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided, and acted.
At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt. One of the callers ended her message as follows: "Everyone's running up to first class. I've got to go. Bye."
The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assault muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listened to the recording report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the din. We cannot identify whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained.
In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt the assault. The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses and plates. At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane.
Five seconds later, Jarrah asked, "Is that it? Shall we finish it off?" A hijacker responded, "No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off." The sounds of fighting continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and down. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said, "In the cockpit. If we don't we'll die!" Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled, "Roll it!" Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said, "Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!" He then asked another hijacker in the cock-pit, "Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?" to which the other replied, "Yes, put it in it, and pull it down."
The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said, "Pull it down! Pull it down!" The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them. The airplane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the right. The airplane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting "Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest." With the sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes' flying time from Washington, D.C....
The first two incidents were portrayed -- whether the conversations as shown are court stenographer accurate or not is immaterial -- in the film. The third was only implied. (Is the film any less reliable because that death struggle was omitted?) As we all suspect, those actions may have saved the US Capitol or the White House, and therefore constituted far more decisive actions than anything ordered up to the morning of September 11, 2001 by a department or cabinet level official in either the Clinton or Bush administrations. If anything, that is the major argument the film makes: we were saved from perhaps even greater sorrow not by any of the "great and good", but by some of the "little people".
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Interestingly, as it had just before Trenton, days later when his core units' enlistments were due to expire, the moment again rested with George Washington:
...When they were all at attention the general rode forward, reined up in front of the line, and began to speak. Briefly, he praised them for the success at Trenton and told what it had meant for the country and why they, the veterans of the army, were still needed. They were the soldiers Tom Paine had written about -- the ones who carried the Revolution on their shoulders while others stayed at home -- and if they would just remain with him for a few more weeks, he said, they could do more for their country than they ever might again. As a special inducement, he was prepared to offer them a bounty of ten dollars in addition to their pay for sticking with the army for six more weeks...
...What few men knew at the time was that Washington, in promising the bounty to his soldiers, had violated one of the cardinal principles of his office: he had pledged the public credit with no authorization whatever. But as he wrote John Hancock by way of explanation, "What could be done?" He was willing to back up the pledge with his own private resources, if need be, hoping that he would be supported by other responsible citizens...
...What few men knew at the time was that Washington, in promising the bounty to his soldiers, had violated one of the cardinal principles of his office: he had pledged the public credit with no authorization whatever. But as he wrote John Hancock by way of explanation, "What could be done?" He was willing to back up the pledge with his own private resources, if need be, hoping that he would be supported by other responsible citizens...
While he might there seem as just another male, executive, military fascist, overreaching his power, lacking a satellite hook-up he might have instead confined himself to his hut and bombarded Congress with letters requesting instructions. ("What does counsel say?" "Do we need a finding?" "Can you corroborate this?" "What do the French know?" "What clearance do I have?" "What are our other options?".) But he couldn't wait. Within hours, if something wasn't done, he would have found himself general of nobody, and the war lost.
So, he took a chance, and stuck his neck out . . . again; a career that saw him normally more than willing to take risks to do the right thing, and humbly accept blame when things didn't go well, is why we remember him. It is pretty obvious that in the months and years prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, none of our overly inflated egos in similarly subordinate roles, but who envision themselves as another Washington, were willing, when push came to shove, actually to behave like another Washington.
Highly arrogant, yet possessing submerged fears of being caught in any error, none of them had been willing, as he had been at Trenton and afterwards, to take a calculated risk or two. Amazingly, they seemed to believe "the glory" (to be admired, applauded, fawned over, and after serving to get book deals, boardroom jobs, posts at think tanks or universities from which to pontificate on their vast experience) could be had without ever exercising "the responsibility". On one level, that's not their fault, really, because given America's blessed position of only rarely facing extreme situations, most of the time our politicians never face a single one of the extreme sort of "DECISION NEEDED NOW!" situations Washington did far more than once; so they are able mostly to get "the glory" -- even if a cheapened version -- while being able to avoid having to exercise any great amount of "the responsibility". But on another level, on September 11, 2001 America suffered greatly for its (up to then, at least) mostly blessed position.
Yes, those who served in the years leading to September 11, 2001, of course, couldn't know precisely what was coming. Dean Esmay is dead right in stating:
...It's a fool's errand to say that they "should have" done X or Y or Z. So I'll take it back: it wasn't like Fahrenheit 9/11, which was vicious and warped and utterly dishonest in its entire presentation. Maybe these film-makers needed some correction, but at least they were trying to get it right. Because, based on what they showed on TV tonight, it was obvious that all involved were fallible humans trying to do the right thing, with all the ambiguities that always involves...
But unlike what confronts most politicians over their careers, after September 11, 2001 actually happened, as history crowds into those attacks as it invariably does on any pivotal moments (for instance, far more people today probably know the names of the commanders of Lee's divisions on the last day at Gettysburg than can name the presidents between Lincoln and F.D.R.), what is seen of the details simply isn't pretty. They had indeed faced what was a brewing extreme challenge, but managed never to see it. As it turned out "the responsibility" was there to be taken, and if any one properly accepted it, "the glory" earned might have been immeasurable.
But when alone with their individual authority, and even if given every aid, technology, and resource, decisions still had to be made and be the right ones. Responsibility still had to be shouldered, somewhere, by someone. However, in the end, facing it had all proved too much for all of them.
Yet had one or two accepted some responsibility, their memoirs might actually be read and taken seriously generations from now. As it is, within a few years any such reminiscences will likely be seen as little more than self-justifying, out of print irrelevancies from another era. After all, who the heck a hundred years from now will want to read "My Years in Government, 1993-2001: When I Almost Did Something"? Probably no more than the number now fascinated by the latest, say, Thomas A. Hendricks biography. ¶ by Robert, Friday, September 15, 2006
